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GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Washington, D.C. 20451

Established by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of Sept. 26, 1961

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Declass Review by NIMA/DOD

Dear Dick,

This will confirm my invitation to you at breakfast yesterday to meet with the Committee on May 28 to consider our overall strategic intelligence capability.

We have revised our draft agenda along the lines of our discussion. I do think that the Committee should have the benefit not only of your over-all judgment but of direct contact with the specialized organizations as well. With that in mind, we shall count on you to give the Committee the total picture at the outset and on [redacted] to tie up any loose ends at the end of the specialized presentations. If you would like to have [redacted] with you to start us off, that would be fine.

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Could I also ask you to arrange for someone from the National Photographic Interpretation Center to speak with us about their speciality from 1:45 to 2:45 p.m.?

I am enclosing our agenda and a full set of questions as a guide to the Committee's particular interests and as an aide to reducing overlapping presentations. Our questions are intended as a general outline and I hope that you will feel free to adjust your remarks to the Committee as you think best to give us the basic understanding that we want to acquire.

If there are details to arrange, your staff can discuss them with [redacted]

The Honorable
Richard Helms,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Headquarters Building.

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
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Thanks again for coming down for breakfast and giving us the benefit of your advice.

Sincerely,

Jack



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Enclosures:

1. Draft Agenda. (SECRET)
2. Guide Questions. (TOP SECRET CW)

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General Advisory Committee

May 28, 1970

Place: Operations Center Conference Room - 7514
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Time: 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.

DRAFT AGENDA

U.S. Strategic Intelligence Capability

9:00 a.m. Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence Resources and
Significance for SALT, Mr. Richard Helms,
Director, CIA

10:00 a.m. Military Intelligence and Special Collection
Operations, DIA

11:00 a.m. Electronic Intelligence Collection and
Processing, NSA

12:00 Noon Aerospace Intelligence Operations

1:00 p.m. Lunch

1:45 p.m. Aerospace Photography Interpretation, NPIC

2:45 p.m. Strategic Intelligence Interpretation, Mr.
[redacted] Director for Strategic Research, CIA

3:45 p.m. Status of SALT [redacted] Acting 25
Director, ACDA

5:00 p.m. Executive Session

6:00 p.m. Adjournment

Chairman's Office: Room 7509; [redacted] 25

May 12, 1970

General Advisory Committee

Questions for the
Meeting of May 28, 1970

Electronic Intelligence Collection
and Processing
(NSA)

1. What is the magnitude and nature of the COMINT/ELINT effort directed against the Soviet Union and China?
2. What kinds of information, with concrete examples, is provided by the COMINT technique?
3. What kinds of information, with concrete examples, is provided by the ELINT technique, including telemetry analysis?
4. What confidence do we have in our ability to overcome improving Soviet security measures?
5. Can the U.S. keep pace with the expanding volume of Soviet communications?
6. In what ways does communications monitoring relate to SALT and the development of strategic weapons?
7. What advances are being made in collecting, processing, and analyzing electronic data on Soviet and Chinese missile and radar research and testing?
8. What are the prospects that the Soviets or Chinese could prevent the United States from acquiring data now being collected in their missile and radar research and testing?

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General Advisory Committee

Questions for the
Meeting of May 28, 1970

Strategic Intelligence Interpretation
(CIA)

1. Taking account of all sources of information, how reliable is U.S. knowledge of Soviet and Chinese strategic weapons R and D, production, flight testing and deployment?
2. With what confidence and with what quickness can we detect changes and improvements in Soviet and Chinese systems, e.g. MIRV or SPRINT type of ABM?
3. What is the relative contribution to our understanding of strategic weapons of the different types of collection and which of these might be impaired by increased Soviet security measures?
4. What would be the effect upon the reliability of our intelligence of a strategic arms limitation agreement with cooperative means of verification provisions affecting weapon testing as contrasted to continued unrestricted weapons research and development?

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General Advisory Committee

Questions for the
Meeting of May 28, 1970

Military Intelligence and Special
Collection Operations
(DIA)

1. What types of data are collected and analyzed by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the three military services about the Soviet Union and China, particularly with respect to strategic weapons?
2. What kinds of area surveillance operations are directed at the Soviet Union and China or carried on around the borders, including both overt and attaché collections, peripheral or "ferret" reconnaissance and remote technical operations such as Early Warning and backscatter radar?
3. What are the collection capabilities of the U.S. Navy, both active and passive, with respect to Soviet and Chinese shipping and especially seaborn strategic weapons?
4. What other special sensors and platforms are or have been used or are technically feasible and available that could be used to observe specific Soviet and Chinese strategic weapons operations?

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General Advisory Committee

Questions for the
Meeting of May 28, 1970

Satellite Intelligence Operations
(NRO)

1. What systems have been or are now in operation that provide data on the USSR and China?
2. What additional contribution is made by satellite systems operated by the military services and by NASA?
3. What are future projections of coverage and how might they be augmented in the event of a strategic arms agreement?
4. What types of remote sensors applicable to strategic weapons monitoring are under development?
5. What steps can be taken to overcome Soviet or Chinese deception, camouflaging or other counter measures?

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General Advisory Committee

Questions for the
Meeting of May 28, 1970

Satellite Photography Interpretation
(NPIC)

1. What information can satellite photography provide about developments in the USSR and China and especially about strategic weapons development and deployment?
2. How does satellite photography draw upon and contribute to other information collection methods?
3. How frequent, comprehensive and detailed is our coverage of Soviet and Chinese strategic weapons facilities and deployment?
4. What are the limitations and vulnerability of photographic intelligence?
5. What can be done to improve the quality of photographic intelligence?
6. Could an added photographic intelligence effort significantly increase our confidence in our knowledge of Soviet and Chinese strategic weapons development and deployment?

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General Advisory Committee

Questions for the
Meeting of May 28, 1970

Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence Resources
and Their Significance for SALT
(CIA)

1. What has been the post war evolution of intelligence collection and evaluation techniques as a whole which have a bearing on Soviet and Communist Chinese strategic weapons?
2. What is the extent and the nature of the resources of all kinds currently available to the United States and its allies maintaining surveillance of the Soviet Union and mainland China with particular regard to their strategic weapons programs?
3. Does broad knowledge of the Soviet Union based on conventional collection and analysis contribute significantly to our interpretation of strategic weapon developments derived from primarily technical intelligence? Does this spectrum of efforts reduce Soviet confidence in their ability to conceal major strategic weapons programs?
4. What are the principal areas of uncertainty and weakness in our collection and evaluation effort against Soviet and Chinese strategic weapons?
5. How would future intelligence operations be affected by either an arms control agreement or by failure to agree to restrain strategic arms competition?

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6. How confident can we be that our total intelligence resources, present and projected, would provide timely warning of a significant Soviet violation of the type of agreement that we are now attempting to negotiate in Vienna?

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NPIC/TSSG-005-70

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director, NPIC

THROUGH : Special Assistant, NPIC

SUBJECT : Visit by [redacted] Personnel

1. Per our conversation, [redacted] Group
Director, [redacted] will visit
NPIC on 19 May 1970. Visitors will arrive at 0930 and will be
introduced to you at that time.

2. [redacted] will brief for 15 minutes on NPIC
Organization, followed by [redacted] orientation by [redacted]
[redacted]

3. Parking is being arranged by [redacted]

[redacted]
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Chief

Technical Services & Support Group, NPIC

Distribution:

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